Research

My research addresses topics in international and comparative political economy. My core research has focused on the consequences of economic integration for democracy, accountability, and prospects of income redistribution in emerging economies. I am also interested in economic voting, the politics of foreign direct investment and political risk, and Latin American politics. Click here for my C.V. in pdf format.

Book

“The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America: Globalization and Democracy” Cambridge University Press, 2015

In this book, I employ a combination of formal theory, large-N empirical analyses, as well as in-depth case studies of Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina, to shed light on the inner workings and long term consequences of ians during national elections. It identifies how financial markets respond to the victory of the left, and determines the political and economic financial markets’ influence on economic policymaking. The book focuses on the interaction between investors and politic conditions under which market responses push leftist governments into adopting a conservative economic agenda. The book also explains why market discipline, imposed during elections, leads to long-term ideological convergence between left and right-wing economic policies in some political systems but not in others.

Book Manuscript

“Merit, Luck and Representation”  (with Cesar Zucco, under review at Cambridge University Press)

Economic voting is a widely accepted regularity in the political science literature, yet most work on the subject either assumes that economic performance is a direct result of policymaking or, more recently, argues that voters can identify when this is not the case. Our book challenges these claims by showing that, in a large subset of Latin American countries, presidents’ success largely depends on factors that are unambiguously exogenous to policymaking. We adopt a multi-method approach to explore the conditions that affect voters’ capacity to distinguish competence from chance when evaluating their governments, as well as the implications of that behavior for representation.

Articles and Chapters